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servant relationship, do the courts of Ohio consider the plaintiff's rem-
edies against the servant and against the master as being consistent or as
being inconsistent? The answer to that question seems to be that the
Ohio cases are in a state of confusion. There is one line of cases which
refuses joinder of master afid servant and requires election of remedies
on the theory that the plaintiff's remedies are inconsistent. Clark v. Fry,
supra; French v. Central Construction Co., supra; Cordes v. Deopke,
supra. Another line of cases recognizes that the remedies are consistent,
and even though joinder cannot be permitted because of contrary prece-
dent, the application of the doctrine of election of remedies is denied.
Maple v. Railroad, supra; Schultz v. Brunhoff Mfg. Co., supra;
L'Archcr v. Rosenberger, 3 Ohio Op. 101, 103 (1935); Land v.
Berzin, supra, the'principal case. The holding of the principal case, as
indicated, follows the theory of the latter group of cases recognizing the
consistency of the remedies. In light of the foregoing discussion, such a
holding is to be commended. Where one rule prohibited joinder and
another rule required election of remedies, a situation would be created
whereby the chances of the plaintiff's recovery would be largely deter-
mined by the application of technical procedural rules. It is the group
of cases finding the remedies consistent and refusing to apply the doctrine
of election of remedies which saved the Ohio law from getting into such
a predicament. The solution to the problem, of course, lies in the abro-
gation of both the rule against joinder and the doctrine of election of
remedies in master-servant situations. It is hoped that the supreme court
will see fit not only to affirm the rule laid down in the principal case,
but also to overrule the cases which have refused joinder.
PHILIP AULTMAN
ALTERNATIVE PLEADING IN OHIO
In an action founded on the breach of a contract to lease property,
plaintiff's prayer was that the court decree specific performance or alter-
natively, if equitable relief should be denied, award damages in lieu
thereof. The trial court found the plaintiff disentitled to specific per-
formance because of laches but assessed damages in his favor. Neither
party at this first trial requested a jury. On appeal the judgment relative
to laches and the right to specific performance was affirmed, but the
case was reversed and remanded because of the application of an improper
measure of damages. The court denied defendant's request for a jury
made early in the second trial stating as its reason "the equitable rule
that where a court of equity has once acquired jurisdiction, it will retain
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the case until complete justice has been done, settling all questions inci-
dent to the principal relief sought." When the case was brought before
it again the Appellate Court in its application of General Code 11379
providing that " . . . Issues of fact arising in actions for the recovery
of money only . .. shall be tried by a jury, unless a jury trial be
waived . . . " quoted statements of the Supreme Court in Gunsaullus
v. Pettit, 46 Ohio St. 27, 17 N.E. 231 (I888), to the effect that under
this provision the right of a party to trial by jury does not depend upon
the character of the principles upon which he bases his right to relief,
but upon the nature and character of the relief sought. Hickman v. Co.,
58 Ohio App. 38, i Ohio Op. 425, 15 N.E. (2d) 648, Ohio Bar
(June 13, 1938) (936).
The absence of any common agreement among the courts on the
proper manner of dealing with pleadings under the code, even on this
simple fact situation, results in this case being set down for a third retrial.
Uncertainty still remains as to the proper disposition of the issues on the
first trial when both the equitable and legal features of the case are to
be adjudicated. Will either of the parties lose any of the rights that
would have resulted to them in separate legal and equitable trials? In
what particulars can one safely plead alternatively? It is extremely
hazardous to state whether or not alternative or hypothetical pleading
is permitted in Ohio for several reasons: first, the term is used in varying
senses in legal writings and in the opinions; second, there is a peculiar
scarcity of recent decisions purporting to rule directly on the point;
third, it is quite conceivable, and neither proven nor disproven, that the
practice and consequent rulings vary widely throughout the State and
yet are more frequently assumed than contested. Numerous statements
may be found in Ohio cases to the effect that alternative pleading is per-
missible under the codes. Other statements pertaining to certainty, hard
to reconcile with this position, also appear. An Ohio case is numbered
among those indicative of the adoption of the rule of alternative pleading
by judicial interpretation at page 173 in Clark on Code Pleading. (See
cited infra, Dick v. Hyer).
In one group of the existent rulings the uncertain or alternative
quality pertains, as in the principal case, to the remedy sought. In an
action wherein plaintiff prayed that the written contract for the sale of
a right of way be corrected to conform to the agreement as he stated
it and that the court decree specific performance of the corrected con-
tract, or that the court rescind the written contract and for other relief,
the Supreme Court of Ohio held it error for the trial court to hold the
written contract invalid and refuse to give supplemental judgment for
damages. Railroad Co. v. Steinfeld, 42 Ohio St. 451 (1884). Although,
inasmuch as plaintiff sought to overturn the written contract executed
by mistake, each alternative included equitable features, it is virtually
like the principal case in its request alternatively for specific performance
or damages and differs only in the definiteness of the latter. The court
has been held to be empowered to decree cancellation of a lease when
the plaintiff sought specific performance and "such other and further
relief in the premises as equity and conscience require." Coffinberry v.
Oil Co., 68 Ohio St. 488, 67 N.E. IO69 (1903). When the action is
one to set aside fraudulent deeds and the prayer is for cancellation and
general relief, it is not error to decree a reconvveyance to the plaintiff.
Riddle v. Rall, 24 Ohio St. 572, 5 Ohio Dec. Rep. 232 (1874). When
plaintiff alleges breach of warranty and knowledge by the defendant that
the warranty was false, failure to prove knowledge of the falsity cannot
prejudice the right of recovery for breach of warranty. Gartner v.
Cotrine, 57 Ohio St. 246, 48 N.E. 945 (1897). More doubtful in
its interpretation of plaintiff's wishes is the adjudication in Brundridge v.
Goodlove, 30 Ohio St. 374 (1876). Relying on the breach by an irre-
sponsible person of a negative covenant not to practice medicine, the
complaining party after alleging and praying for damages, sought a per-
petual injunction against irreparable injury. Though the court's ruling
that he was erroneously denied the jury trial which he requested may
be correct, one may doubt that the two remedies were meant to be
alternative and not supplemental or that plaintiff's insistence on a jury
was an election so to regard them with an indicated preference for
damages. When recovery based on the legal theory advanced would
result in judgment for damages against one group of the defendants and
recovery on the equitable theory would bind another group, it has been
held that the adjudication and dismissal of the equitable features does not
change the character of the action so as to enable one of the first class
of defendants to withdraw his waiver of a jury trial. Engine Co. v.
MIfg. Co., 8 Ohio App. 341, 30 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 177 (1917).
Draper v. Moore 13 Ohio Dec. Rep. 834 (1872) goes still further than
the cases thus far cited but is quite in line with the attitude of the Steinfeld
case in its holding that it is error to dismiss an action merely without
prejudice to a subsequent action for damages, when plaintiff has asked
specific performance of a modification of the contract and for all other
proper relief in the premises. What appears to be the reasonable view of
the matter was there stated: "To the code petition there must be a
demand of the relief to which the party supposes himself entitled. At
common law the facts often give the party a choice of several remedies,
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to be obtained by bringing one or the other of several different actions.
As this cannot now be done, the party is to state the relief he asks. If
not proper, or not the most appropriate in the opinion of the Court, the
proper relief will be granted. When upon the pleadings and evidence
a party is entitled to any relief, it is error to dismiss his case, and compel
him to bring another action."
Frequently the plaintiff encounters practical difficulties in drawing
his petition because some of the operative facts are beyond his knowledge.
It is manifestly unfair to require him then to blindly assume a definite
stand at his peril. The courts have not always shown themselves sym-
pathetic toward this practical difficulty. Under an allegation "that de-
fendant saw or by the exercise of ordinary care could have seen him"
McGinn v. Columbus R. & Light Co., 4 Ohio App. 398, 25 Ohio
C.C. (N.S.) 212 (1913) (aft. without opinion, 90 Ohio St. 384
(1914) ruled that plaintiff could prove either fact. However, it was
there implied that a motion to make more definite should, in such a
case, be entertained; a subsequent case so held. Harris v. Webb 22
Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 359, 31 Ohio Dec. 387 (1919). An alternative
form has been prescribed, strangely, as the only means of avoiding an
inconsistency in legal theory between defendant's general denial and
plea of contributory negligence. Latham v. Columbus .R. Co., 8 Ohio
N.P. (N.S.) 185, 19 Ohio Dec. 333 (1909). Restrained from using
the normal alternative or conditional language in such a situation, plain-
tiffs have resorted by analogy to the older common law method by
incorporating one interpretation of the uncertain fact in one count, the
contrary interpretation in a second count. This method of pleading has
been generally sustained against attack. Citizens Nat'l. Bank v. C. N.
0. Ry. Co., 8 Ohio Dec. Rep. 788, 9 Wkly. L. Bull. 355 (1883);
Citizens Nat'l. Bank v. N. 0. & T. P. Ry. Co., 9 Ohio Dec. Rep.
147, II Wkly. L. Bull. 86 (1884); First Nat'l. Bank v. C. N. B. &
T. P. Ry. Co., 9 Ohio Dec. Rep. 702, 16 Wkly. L. Bull. 399 (1886).
On the other hand, the overruling of a motion to more definitely state
directed against essentially this type of statement has been held to be
error, even though non-prejudicial. Cincinnati v. Third Natl. Bank,
i Ohio C.C. 199, I Ohio C.D. 1O9 (1885). Where this dual state-
ment of the facts was employed so as to coincide with either of two
possible interpretations of a statute, plaintiff was required to elect between
them. Sturges v. Burton, 8 Ohio St., 215, 72 Am. Dec. 582 (1858).
When no purpose whatsoever is served by the dual statement the second
has been regarded as mere surplusage. Ferguson v. Gilbert & Rush,
16 Ohio St. 88 (1865). When plaintiff alleged that the wroggful act
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was both wilful and negligent, a motion to elect was sustained on the
ground that plaintiff must unconditionally and not alternatively preclude
his own negligence as a directly contributing cause of the injury. Hop-
man v. Terminal Co., 12 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 543, 23 Ohio Dec. 505
(1912). The court, in Citizens Nat'l. Bank v. C. N. 0. Ry. Co.,
supra, rightly recognizes that multiplicity of counts in common law
pleadings was one of the objects which the code specifically desired to
remedy and states: "There is no question that the commissioners who
drafted the code, understood that in a petition under the code, there
would be in a case like this, not two causes of action but one, incor-
porating in one all the facts together with a prayer for alternative relief."
In the absence of uncertainty as to the existence of a fact no practical
reason can be cited for the extension of the practice of duplicate state-
ment. However, the apparent doubt that the court would follow the
liberal view earlier discussed of permitting an alternative and partially
conditional prayer and awarding any relief to which the proven facts
showed plaintiff entitled, together with the natural difficulty of the legal
mind to conceive of a right to recover severed from the theory of
recovery itself, have combined to make common the use of separate
counts coincident with the various theories of recovery. Murphy v.
Quigley, 21 Ohio C.C. 313, II Ohio C.D. 638 (19oo); Fugman v.
Trostler, 24 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 521, 34 Ohio C.D. 746 (1903) ; Dick
v. Hyer, 94 Ohio St. 351, 114 N.E. 251 (1916); Boswell v. Security
Life Ins. Co., 13 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 364, 30 Ohio Dec. 581 (1912).
One may well doubt that the courts have succeeded, in the spirit of
the codes, in working out a reasonable system of procedure avoiding the
rigidity, artificiality and repetition of the common law procedure. Never-
theless, if all of these objectionable features cannot at once be eliminated
considerations of practicability should have preference over those of mere
form. The view of the Judicial Council of the State, in its 1939 Report
to the General Assembly, is that greater leeway must be given to the
free and normal statement of the relevant facts if prompt adjudication
of claims, free from procedural technicalities, is to be facilitated. If these
recommendat6ns are accepted and made part of the law, the courts will
be presented with another opportunity to work out a simple and reason-
able technique of procedure bounded only by the requirement of respon-
siveness to the needs of the parties and the convenience of the court.
Text of the proposed amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure:
Joinder of Causes.
Sec. 11306
(c) Alternative Statement Permitted. A party may set forth two or
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more statements of a claim or defense alternatively or hypothetically.
When two or more statements are made in the alternative and one of
them if made independently would be sufficient, the pleading is not made
insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the alternative state-
ments. A party may also state as many separate claims or defenses as
he has regardless of consistency and whether based on legal or on
equitable grounds or on both. All statements shall be made subject to
the obligations set forth in Sec. 11336.
ANNA FAYE BLACKBURN
REAL PROPERTY
ALLOWANCE OF ATTORNEY FEES IN STATUTORY PARTITION
Plaintiff sought to partition a piece of land which was subject to a
mortgage. The mortgagee consented to come into the partition proceed-
ings. Even though the proceeds of the partition sale were insufficient to
cover the mortgage indebtedness, the Court of Appeals for Hamilton
County gave plaintiff's attorney priority in his claim for a fee over the
mortgagee. Klosterman v. Klosterman, 58 Ohio Ap. 511, 16 N.E.
(2d) 826 (1938).
The decision was made on the authority of Ohio G. C. section
12,050, "Having regard to the interest of the parties, the benefit each
may derive from a partition, and according to equity, the court shall tax
the costs and expenses which accrue in the action including reasonable
counsel fees, which must be paid to plaintiff's counsel unless the court
awards some part thereof to other counsel for service in the case for the
common benefit of all the parties, and execution may issue therefore as
in other cases."
There are several other statutes in Ohio allowing attorney fees to
be assessed as costs: in taxpayer's suits for the recovery of misappropriated
funds, Gen. Code sec. 2923; in suits by municipalities for appropriation
of land (allowance to defendant's attorney if land is not taken or money
paid over within six months after the decree) Gen. Code sec. 3697; in
suits for the collection of sanitary district assessments, Gen. Code sec.
6602-85; in land owner's suits for costs of erecting a fence for a rail-
road, Gen. Code sec. 8915; in appeals from justice courts to the com-
mon pleas court when there is a failure to substantially better appellant's
judgment, Gen. Code sec. 10,356; in appeals from the court of appeals
to the Supreme Court where there is no reasonable cause for appeal,
Gen. Code sec. 12,223-36; in proceedings by one holding a mechanic's
